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JUDICIAL DECISIONS
EDITED BY C. W. IQOKE
ProJwror o/ Low, G r o r p d m Univerdy

The City’s Liability on Street Improvement fund is to he aw~t..ui.”~andthe court further held
recent decision of the Supreme that while .these street improvement bonb did
Court of Iowa, holding a city liable for the h- not of themoelves create an indebtedness of the
ance of street improvement bonds. w
ill no doubt city, they did, however, crate an obligation of
act as a warning to municipalities in this state in the city to perform certain statutory dutiea in
the issuing of such b o n b in the future.’ The the levy and collection of pecial tues for tbc
Iowa law authorized cities and t o m to aasesa the payment of the bonds. “The liability of the
city.” Mid the court, “an8a out of the breach
mt of street improvements against property
subject to Pssessment therefor. and the council of the obligations of the bond. The caw of
is empowered to im h o n d s for the amount of
action of the bondhokier in in the nature of
damages for such breach. The measure of hi
the aaeaaed cost or any part thereof in anticipadamages is nerrsssrily the unpaid amount of the
tion of the deferred payment of the awssrnents.
The statute prescribes the form in which such bond which has been rendered uncollectsbk by
street improvement bonds shall be issued. which the wrongful breach. In view of the fact that
among other things must contain the statement: the maiaure of damage is specific and ir identical
with the amount of the bond. the distinction
It is hereby certi6ed and m i t e d that all tbe hetween an action on the bond,and an action for
acts. conditions. and things required to be done,
the breach of it, becomes a mere matter of
d e n t to and in issuing this series of bonds.
WOnia.”
Rave been done. happened, and performed, in
regular and due form. as required by Law and
Pour different bonds were involved in thii
anid resolution. and for the assessment. collection oase:
and payment haeon of said special tax, the full
1. Payment on the tint bond had been
faith and diligence of said city (or town) of refused by the city treasurer on the p u n d tlut
are hereby irrevocably pledged.’
there WM no fund out of which it could be paid.
It is also provided that
Tbe court held that it WIU the duty of the city to
Such certi6catts, bonds. and coupons shall not provide by special aasessment a fund ndEcient
make the city liable in any way, except for the to pay the bonds and the intereat on them.
proper application of said special taxes.’
0. In the second bond it appeared that proviMany cities have found, for one ceaSOn or sion had originally been made for special
another. that there wm no money in the spccial ments sufficient to pay off all the bonds in the
fund to pay the principal and interest on the last series, but that certain property ownem maeaaed
bonds in the series. Cities have usually con- successfully prusecuted appeals in the dirtrid
tended that they were not liable under the statute court. which materially reduced the anticipated
for indebtedness incurred in this manncr.
collections for the special auarsment fund and
On Decomber 13, 1QU.the Supreme Court of
thus made the plaintiffs bond uncollectable.
Ionx passed upon this question in a test cwe The court held the city at fault for not making
which involved four diflerent street improve up the deficiency by rcaaawsing the amount of
ments’ b n d s of the city of Dw Moines. The auch depletion against the abutting property.
court reaffirmed a previous decision that a “city
“Its duty a t this point,” mid the court, “wan no
can render i k l f liable if in breach of the terms less than its origid duty to make an assessment
of the bond it wrongfully fails to perform its duty
adequate to the peyment of the bonds.”
and its pledge pertaining to the assessment and
3. In the third caae a bond for )coo wad mucollection of the special t a x by which the special d e n 4 uncollectnble because certain property
owners bad failed and refused to pay their
1 Howr v. Cily of Du Mmnw. 216 N.Y.689.
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assessments and the county treasurer had failed
to oollact the cmme by tax d e for want of a bidder. Here the court held that the city had
wholly failed to exercise ita statutory power in
i ~ had
~ breached
the making of such ~ l l e c tand
its pledge of good faith and diligence to that end.
The city could have bid in the property and
thus enforced itn lien.
4. The fourth bond wan the lost in its eeriea,
which could not be paid for la.& of funds, because
the aaaentments on certain properties were in
exof 45 per cent of their value. Some of the
ownem refwed to pay the tax, and the county
treasurer found no bidden at tax d e , but at M
adjourned tax d e the properties were sold for
lees than the amount of the tax,thus making the
deficiency in the fund. The court made quick
work of this w e , declaring that if the 8sclesament
had been confined to 96 per cent of the value of
the property, as provided by law, the full amount
of the tax could have been collected by tax sale.
In the light of this deckion there seems to be
nothing for the citiee which have defaulted on
public improvement bonC to do but to accept
their liability. The American Munin’paldk
for January, in commenting upon this decision,
seemn to imply that cities would be better off if
they issued “certificates” instead of bonds. In
view of another recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Iowa in the caae of Wutnn Aaplualt
Paving Company v. Citg of Marahalltown,‘ it
would Beem that there is little opportunity for a
city in this state to escape its liability for either.
bonds or certificates issued in payment of public
improvements. This is, no doubt, as it should
be, and these decisions should serve aa a warning
to city councils and the taxpayers alike that
when public improvements are undertaken
which are payable by special assessments upon
the benefited property, the greatest care must be
exercised to make sure that the property assessed
will be able to pay out. When the city asks the
contractor or the public to take these street
improvement bonds and certificates. the good
name and credit of the city demands that the
city make p d any deficiencies arising from
errors of judgment or negligence on the part of the
city authorities. U this were not so, cities might
6nd it difficult to finance such improvements
because of’lack of confidence on the part of
contractors and investors in special assessment
dties.
The decision will no doubt work a hardship
. a 214 N. W.687 (Iowa. lQ27).
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upon those cities whose over-optimistic councils
have forced street improvements upon their
communities in advance of their needs and beyond the ability of the property assessed to meet
the payments. But when city councils realize
that street improvement bonds will become
general obligations of the city, unless properly
and legally assessed. they will weigh more
carefully the objections of property owners
before disregarding them.

FRANK
E.HOEACK.
The State University of Iowa.

*

Special Assessments-Direct Liability of City
on Bonds Issued.-The
interesting note by
M e n s o r Horack on the case of Eallgc v. Dw
Muinea suggests a comparison with another
recent case involving the m e point. In Moore
v. Cdg of Nampa, 18 Fed. (ad) 880,decided by
the Circuit Court of Appeals, ninth circuit, in
April. 1937, the bonds in question contained
recitals similar to those in the Hauge case, and
the liability of the city was likewise predicated
upon the negligence of the city in failing to perform its statutory duties to make a valid levy
and collect the funds to pay the bonds. The
Idaho statute provided that the holder of such
bonds “shall have no remedy therefor against the
municipal corporation by which the same is
issued in any event, except for the collection
of the special assessment made . . ., but his
remedy in case of nonpayment shall be confined
to the enforcement of such assessment.” The
court affirmed a judgment of the district court
sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.
These two cases illustrate the conflict of
decisions that prevails in this class of cases
based upon like facts, but the great weight of
authority is in support of the view of the Circuit
Court of Appeals. If the city is relieved of
direct liability, the bondholder has a remedy by
mandamus to compel the proper ofIicers to make
a new or supplementary assessment and collect
the necessary funds to liquidate the bonds. The
earlier cases bearing upon the general question
of the direct liability of the special assessment
district are reviewed in an extensive note to
Capitd Heighta v. Steiner. 311 Ala. 640, 101
So. 451, published in 38 A. L. R. le71 (1955).
The Hauge case is supported by a long line of
decisionsin Iowa (note, 18 Iowa Law Review 81).
and evidently the only method left open to avoid
the direct liability of municipal corporations on
that state is by an amendment to the enabling

asa

NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW

act further expressly restricting the right of the
bondholder against the city to a remedy by
mandamus and requiring a recital in the bond
itself of such a limitation and that it is payable
only out of proceeds of the funds raised by the
special assessment. As the constitutional limi-tations upon municipal indebtedness are uniformly held not to apply to judgments in tort,
the evil of excessive direct obligations upon the
city, resulting from failure to perform statutory
duties of this nature, should be kept within
reasonable bounds wherever, as here, it can be
done without injustice to anyone.

*

Municipallb&ms-m.-The
Supreme
court of I(anrrasin Wichitav. Chpp, a6s Pac. 19.
decided January 7 of this year, holds that a city
of the first class under ita power to acquire lands
within five miles of its limits for park purposea
may take land for a park, 70 per cent of which is
to be used for an aviation field. The court in
its opinion reviews the progress of aviation and
cites the statutes of various states expressly
conferring the power in question. It also reviews the decision# which show the extension of
park functions to include tourist camps and other
new social activities. This progressive view of
the extension of the implied power of municipalities by the change in social conditions ia not
followed by some states (Kennedy v. Neuada,
581 S. W. 56, Mo. 1926). and therefore the express
delegation of the power to establish airports is
advisable. (See Act No. 328, Pa. Laws of
1925, Ch. 534. Sec. 57, Mass. Laws 1959, Sec.
3667,par. 16, General Code of Ohio.) Upon the
general subject of the extension of municipal
functions, the reader may be referred to a note
published in the August, 1996, number of this
REVIEW.

*

-tml
over Building on Mnnufacturing Property Included in Residence District.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in I n re
Gilfillun’s Permit, 140 Atl. 136, has refused to
follow the extremely broad application of the
police power which waa s h e d by the District
Federal Court of Minnesota in American Woodc
Produd Co. v. Minneupolw, 91 Fed. (a)
441,
which was reported in the December, 1947, issue
of the REVIEW. In the instant case the petitioner, who operated a lumber yard in a section
that was mned as a residence district, was refused
a permit to erect on his yard a building of concrete blocks to house his lumber and other

[April

supplies. I n sustaining the court of common
pleas, which directed an issuance of the permit,
the supreme court points out that the erection
of the building in question would lessen the 6re
haurrd, eliminate the tendency of, undesirable
persons to gather in the vicinity, conduce to the
health of the community and enhance the
attractiveness and value of the surrounding
property. As the petitioner’s business had been
long established before the zoning restriction
wapl enacted, the lands were charged with a lawful
use which the city waa without power to deatroy.
This is an illustration of the class of caaea in
which the zoning board of appeals should allow
an exception to be made to the strict ProVisiOM
of the ordinance; otherwise there seems to be no
sound reaeon for its existence. (Dobbinr v.
h Ang&. 195 U. S. aaS; Wss&m Thwlogkul
Seminay v. Emamton. 156 N. E.778.)

*

Police Power--public Taxicab Stand on
Railroad Pmpetty.-The Supreme Court of the
United States, in a decision handed down
February 21. unanimously reversed the decision
of the Circuit Court of Appeals, t h i i circuit.

inD.L.&WW.R.RCo.v.dforristaon.14Fed.
(ed) 2-57,which was commented upon in the
April, 1997, issue of this REVIEW.The court
hqlds that the town does not have any right to
establish a public hackstand on the driveway
upon the plaintiffs premises without just
compensation and that the company may grant
an exclusive privilege therefor to one operator.
Mr. Justice Butler in his opinion says: “The
police power may be and frequently it is exerted
to effect a purpose or consummate an enterprise
in the public interest that requires the taking of
private property; but, whatever the purpose or
the means employed to accomplish it, the owner
is entitled to compensation for what is taken from
him. The railroad grounds, station. platforms,
driveways, etc.. are used by the petitioner for the
purposes of its business as a common carrier and,
while the businem is subject to regulation in the
public interest, the property used belongs to
petitioner. The state may not require it to be
used in that business, or take it for another
public use, without just cornpennation, for that
would contravene the due pnwxss clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Coeee cited.)
“As against thw not using it for the purpose
of transportation, petitioner’s railroad is private
property in every legal sense. The driveway in
question is owned and held by petitioner in the
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same right and stands on the same footing as its
o k f r c i l i t i a . Itaprimary purpose into provide
mesnr of ingress and egress for patrow and others
having burinejs with the petitioner. But, if any
part of the land in the driveway is capable of
other use that does not interfere with the discharge of its obligations as a carrier, petitioner.
an an incident of its ownenhip and in order to
make profit for itself. har a right to U
I C or permit
others to M
I C such land for any lawful purpose."

*

Fdke Powem-Reasonabb Regulation of
Bwiuea Q of Socirl Actioitles.-Under a general delegation of the locol police power a city
may enact regulations which will be in dect
l d laws, provided they pnreribe g e d n k
of conduct fairly definite and are m m b k
rdrptsd to protect or insure the safety, hahlth.
m o d or w
r
d weusre of the community.
"hat a city may enact a valid ordinance denouno
ing (u a dimorderly person anyone who appears or
trsveb upon the stnets masked or disguised M)
M to c o n a d his identity wan atlirmal by the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky in P i d v.
Marahall, lt89 S. W. 1072. That an ordinana
requiring barber shops to close a t 7 P. Y. week
dayr except Saturdays a t 9 P. M. and prohibiting
a l o d barben serving white children is unreanonable and void waa held by the Supreme
Court of Georgia in Chairsr v. ALhnla, 139

S.E.669.
In Nna Cortb v. Withera, 159 Atl. 880, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
city by bill in equity could compel the removal of
plumbing instalkd in the h o w of the defendant
by her husband, a licensed plumber, which WM
found not to comply with the nquiranentr of the
atate plumbing code. The judiad control of
the c o d to set a i d e such a statute, M die-

239

tinguished from an ordinance, is limited to those
caaea where there is a palpable invasion of the
fundamental law or where there appears upon
ita face that it has no real or substantial relation
to the public health, safety or morals; in all other
caaea the legislative determination is held to be
conclusive.
Where the ordinance relates directly to the
public health, the means adopted to secure its
enforcement is most liberally c o ~ t r u e d . h
8atC v. S p i l h , 262 Pac. 128, an ordinana of
the city of Auburn required each home holder to
keep a garbage can and deposit all garbage
therein and imposed a penalty for noncompliance. It wan further provided that the failure
to possess ouch a can and the w of the city
water by the home holder should constitute
prima facie proof of the violation of the ordiMU*.
The Supreme Court of Washington
upheld the ordinance on the authority of
Mob&. dc. R. R. v. Tumipecd, P1D U. S. 95.
The extent to which reasonable control over the
dispwal of garbage by private individupls ertendr is set forth in Cdifmnia Rtdudk Co. v.
Sanitary Radudiun Co., 100 U.S. SOB.
The extent to which discrimination may be
held to be nssonable is illustrated by the decision
of the supreme court of Washington in ~cottlcv.
Qnwri. a68 Pac. Se8. in which an ordinance
excepting from a Sunday closing law the d e of
meals served on the premisea. prepared tobacco.
milk. fruit, confectionery, newspapera, magazines and medical and surgical appliance was
sustained. Classification b e d upon the nature
of the business in upheld on the ground that the
law operates equally upon all persons similarly
rituated. A conviction of the defendant, a
grocer, for a violation of the ordinance WPI
unanimously 8517x14.

